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ABSTRACT 
Cyber has changed the scope of the Navy’s mission and is placing new strains on our diplomatic, 
warfighting, legal, and economic/budgetary processes. Cybersecurity processes and techniques are 
increasingly critical to our warfighting missions, but they can also inhibit the pace and potential for high 
impact, game-changing innovation. Throughout its history, the Navy has shown the ability of innovation 
(in policy, process, and technology) to change the game when our security is on the line. We believe the 
Navy is capable of dramatically impacting not only the U.S. capabilities in cyber conflict and information 
operations, but also in cyber defense and information assurance, as well as cybersecurity for our society. 
While cyber risk management is challenging, the Navy’s transition from DoD Information Assurance 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to the Risk Management Framework (RMF) has the 
potential to harmonize our cybersecurity efforts with our need (and demonstrated ability to provide) for 
game-changing strategies, tactics, and technologies. We offer a foundation for the foregoing assertions 
and recommendations on ways to encourage innovation in the context of effective cyber risk 
management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Information technology has given us a new warfighting domain replete with complexity and attacker 
advantages. Global players are dedicating enormous resources to wage real war in a virtual battlespace. 
The United States Navy, while having a heritage dominated by fighting on the world’s seas, also engages 
in the domains of land, air, and space. In recent years, considerable focus has turned to the cyber domain, 
‘the fifth domain’1. There is increasing acknowledgement that attackers presently enjoy a disproportionate 
advantage in the cyber domain in spite of our apparent resource superiority2. We must innovate both our 
processes and technologies in order to overcome the asymmetries3. We live in a precipitous time where 
we are still learning about the implications that come from a force that leverages technology in a highly 
interconnected way.  
                                                     
1 “War in the Fifth Domain”, The Economist, July 1, 2010, Available at http://www.economist.com/node/16478792.  
2 For a discussion of how “weak” adversaries can establish an asymmetrical advantage and importance of strategy, see, Ivan 
Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 
2001), pp. 93-128. 
3 Oehmen CS, Multari NJ. 2014. "Report on the First Meeting on Asymmetry in Resilience for Complex Cyber 
Systems"Asymmetry in Resilience, September 17-18, 2014, Crystal City, VA. Available at 
http://cybersecurity.pnnl.gov/publications.stm.  
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THE NAVY’S HISTORY OF INNOVATION 
The victor in an engagement is generally the adversary who has the military advantage; that is, a decisive 
asymmetry. Thus, a tacit objective of militaries is to establish and maintain this asymmetry. History 
shows that innovation is responsible for the greatest improvements of military advantage; our Navy 
community can take credit for many of these.  
Discussions of innovation often focus on novelty and technology, but this scope is too narrow to apply 
meaningfully to warfighting. Innovation has many dimensions, none of which should be discounted. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines innovation in one way as “the introduction of novelties; the alteration 
of what is established by the introduction of new elements or forms.”4 Game-changing innovations have 
come in the form of novel or unexpected strategies, tactics, and technologies, including combinations 
thereof. Innovative technologies and processes have been “game-changing” because they dramatically 
and quickly rebalance the advantage.  
An exemplary case is the US Navy Polaris program, which resulted in the first submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) more than 50 years ago. This complex and risky project produced a number of 
high-visibility technological advances in a broad range of scientific and engineering disciplines. However, 
the greatest innovation may have come from advancements in the disciplines of project and risk 
management. Admiral William Rayborn led the Special Project Office in charge of Polaris and delivered 
a critical capability three years ahead of schedule5. The success of this project was attributed to tools still 
used today, including the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). The development and use 
of this management tool revealed the complexities and interdependencies of elements in large projects. 
Without this process innovation, it is likely that the project would have taken many years longer or been 
stopped without ever seeing success.  
Moreover, the success of the Polaris program teases at one of the critical dimensions of disruptive 
innovation: A capability like SLBM is not game-changing unless its arrival is timely. Broad spectrum 
innovation naturally includes advancements in technology, but success may be ultimately determined by 
the economy of resources, including funding and time.  
There have been moments in history where paired strategic and technological innovation have brought 
such significant advantages that they have been deemed ‘offsets’. FitzGerald defines the pursuit of an 
offset as a strategy that allows one force to overcome or mitigate another force’s advantages6. This 
definition describes our position at the beginning of the Cold War: We were at a quantitative disadvantage 
relative to the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Pact with regard to the cost and complexity of 
projecting a conventional force. Leveraging nuclear deterrence offered enormous savings in resources 
compared to conventional deterrence. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had countered our first offset 
capability and a formal Offset Strategy was employed to tap technology as a force multiplier. The 
cornerstone of the second offset was the introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS) and precision 
munitions. Like the first offset, the second offset was effective for a finite period of time. The rest of the 
world has largely caught up to the United States in technological capability in the forty years since. It is 
no surprise that in 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called for a third offset capability7.  
                                                     
4 http://www.oed.com  
5 Byrne, J.J., “Polaris: Lessons in Risk Management”, Multi-Media Publications Inc., 2011. 
6 FitzGerald, B., “Can America Maintain Its Military-Technology Edge?“, Available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-
america-maintain-its-military-technology-edge-11071. 
7 Hagel, C., “Defense Innovation Days” keynote, September 3rd, 2014, Available at 
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/605602. 
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CYBER AND THE EFFECT ON INNOVATION 
Thomas Aquinas captured this maritime truism about risk-taking in his famous 13th century quote, “If the 
highest aim of a captain were to preserve his ship, he would keep it in port forever.8” Shallow inspection 
reveals the limitation of this strategy. A port berth certainly mitigates some risk, but warships are not 
effective fighting while moored to a pier and likely find themselves vulnerable to other grave threats.  
We believe cyber defense and information assurance efforts can stifle or enable game-changing 
innovation at a time when innovation is sorely needed. 
In DoD, information security has an institutionalized history of being compliance-oriented rather than 
risk-oriented. Moreover, in many sectors, attempts to move to risk-based approaches to cyber suffer from 
this compliance-oriented mindset and focus too much on negative risk, rather than on positive risk-taking. 
Frequent attacks, poor baseline security practices, organizational silos, and the challenges of attribution 
all compound the problem and lead organizations to an either/or approach to cyber: Either we clamp 
down on risk-taking in dramatic fashion, or we live in denial of the enormity of the problem.  
We will not succeed in our mission if we operate at these extremes. To navigate the space where we can 
operate, while achieving the ‘right’ level of risk, we have turned to the discipline of risk management.  
THE CHALLENGE OF APPLYING RISK MANAGEMENT TO CYBER 
Cyber poses a formidable problem, and risk management tools, as commonly deployed, do not provide a 
simple fix. Problems can be described by salient properties including their ease of solution. Moreover, 
problems can be categorized by their difficulty. Most problems that we encounter, including those where 
risk management approaches are successful, are tame problems. A harder class of problems is wicked and 
is characterized by demonstrated resistance to being solved; for these problems, there is no guarantee of 
solution. Clemente’s well-written piece describes how cyber is a wicked problem9. Recently, researchers 
have identified an even harder class of problems: super wicked. Levin et al. describe these problems as 
being even more resistant to solution, not because of the problem itself, but because the agent(s) trying to 
solve it add to the difficulty10. We posit that cyber may be a super wicked problem11.  
Consider the two faces of cyber, offense and defense, and the reality that the Navy uses much of the same 
commercial hardware and software that our adversaries do. Addressing a known vulnerability in our 
systems may also have the effect of denying us an offensive tool. Our actions clearly have the potential to 
increase the difficulty of the cyber problem.  
This extreme difficulty explains the frustration that we have when trying to apply standard risk 
management approaches to cyber. Cyber is simply not as tractable as problems like reliability or quality12. 
While there are likely others, we address three specific difficulties of applying standard risk management 
tools to cyber.  
                                                     
8 Aquinas, T., “Summa Theologica”, 1917. 
9 Clemente, D., “International Security: Cyber Security As A Wicked Problem”, Chatham House, October 2011, Available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/8489#sthash.8YcMcefq.dpuf.  
10 Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein S., and Auld, G., “Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining our 
future selves to ameliorate global climate change”, Policy Sciences, 2012, Available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-012-9151-0. 
11 We anticipate publishing a separate paper that expands this argument in the near future. 
12 It is important to note that problems like reliability and quality are not independent with cyber. The addition of 
cyber to the design tradespace must be acknowledged.  
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The first two difficulties arise from approaches that equate risk management with risk assessment. Risk 
assessment is not the same as risk management. Risk assessments are one of the tools used in risk 
management, and they are particularly challenging in the cyber domain. Risk management is 
fundamentally about informed, coordinated decision-making, and risk assessments are only one 
component of supporting decision making. Others include established best practices, and strategic goal 
setting for information security programs. Too much focus on risk assessment is a mistake, particularly 
where it is at the expense of valuable resources (like time), benefit assessment, and timely action-taking.  
In cyber, the first major obstacle to effective risk assessment involves the enumeration of risks. Standard 
risk management approaches call for listing all known risks. A program manager may claim that that they 
have enumerated all risks; a counter-argument to this program manager is the problem of `zero-day 
vulnerabilities’. We can predict the general existence of these vulnerabilities in our systems, but we 
cannot mitigate them until details of their existence are known. 
The second difficulty of conducting cyber risk assessments lies in the assignment of the likelihood 
estimations to adverse events. When faced with managing the risk posed by the reliability of electronics, 
there is a corpus of data, and reliable statistical models can be used to measure uncertainty. Within cyber, 
we face a severe lack of actuarial data or other efficient methods to determine the likelihood of adverse 
events. 
The third difficulty involves the limitations of risk management approaches to non-static boundary 
conditions. The sinking of the USS Thresher in 1963 led to the introduction of the US Navy SUBSAFE 
program. The threat addressed by SUBSAFE is pressurized water that may impinge on the integrity of a 
submarine. The difficulty of addressing this threat is bounded by the invariant laws of physics: Water 
behaves the same way today as it behaved in 1963. In the cyber domain, attackers evolve intelligently and 
quickly, and the complexity and interconnectedness of our information systems, and number of 
vulnerabilities, may be evolving at an even faster pace. While the threats and terrain shift, we understand 
relatively little about cyber’s immutable laws and principles, assuming they exist. Cyber risks are tied to 
potential adverse occurrences that may not be predicted by statistical or probabilistic models; rather, these 
risks are under the direct influence of intelligent, persistent, and well-resourced adversaries. Traditional 
risk management approaches fall short. 
BALANCING INNOVATION AND RISK IN THE CYBER DOMAIN 
Cyber risk management is challenging, and in itself does not provide a perfect set of tools for mission 
assurance. However, when contextualized in an organizational, mission-oriented environment it can be a 
flexible, cross-organization approach to managing risk and maximizing mission success. 
The practical and pragmatic core of any risk management approach to information security is the ability 
of organizations to make systematic, informed decisions about mitigating, transferring, avoiding, and – 
perhaps most importantly – accepting risks. Healthy approaches to risk management are aligned closely to 
enabling the organizational mission. Risk acceptance is particularly critical in any domain where our 
ability to mitigate, transfer, or avoid risks is limited (i.e., residual risk cannot be reduced to zero), or risk-
taking is critical to the organization’s mission. Warfighting is a risk-taking process, and innovation 
follows suit. Risk management holds promise for the cyber domain precisely because (when truly 
embraced) its processes and outcomes acknowledge that we have a mission to accomplish in spite of the 
risks over which we cannot exert perfect control. The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)13 holds 
promise for the Navy because we must intentionally accept some cybersecurity risks in order to innovate 
and achieve our mission. 
                                                     
13 See, NIST Special Publications 800-37 Revision 1 and 800-39. Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.  
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If risk management approaches are treated as compliance, ‘check the box’ regimes, they lose their utility.  
Information security risk can be managed to enable and encourage the kinds of game-changing 
innovations that have fueled our military superiority. But, this requires a rich understanding of how 
innovation and risk relate. Just as we roughly quantify the risk level posed by an adverse threat event as 
approximately equal to the consequence should the event occur times the likelihood of it occurring (i.e., 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≈ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ⋅ 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜)14, we make (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly) a similar 
calculation when we aim for game-changing innovations. When gauging the value of investment in 
innovation, indeed the value inherent in accepting certain risks, we multiply the level of benefit to our 
mission should the investment be successful by the likelihood that it will be successful. Where the 
potential benefit is very high, the likelihood need not be so great.  
On the dark side of risk, we often talk about “black swans.15” These are very high impact, very low 
frequency events that can (and eventually do) happen. Because these risks are critical (even existential) 
and difficult to measure, risk managers of all kinds obsess over them, and rightly so. To reduce the risk 
associated with black swans we prepare to reduce their impact when they do happen, and (only with the 
most existential, most controllable threats) attempt to reduce their probability. On the positive side of risk, 
game-changing innovations are precisely the flip side of the coin. They are very high impact, low 
frequency changes in processes and technologies that drastically increase our security, resilience, or 
ability to overcome an adversary. We lay the groundwork for game-changers by focusing our investments 
on the most critical problems to increase innovation’s impact, and distribute that investment among 
innovation efforts, knowing that not every seed will sprout, to increase game-changer likelihood.  
We can and must continue the Navy’s legacy of game-changing process and technological innovation, 
and cyber must enable, not stifle, that progress. Risk management, when embraced and done in the right 
way, can harmonize reasonable information security and sound risk-taking16.  
CONCLUSION 
In closing, we offer the following recommendations for managing cyber risk to encourage game-changing 
innovation: 
A. Pair process innovation in cyber with technology innovation across the spectrum of naval 
capabilities in order to maximize the likelihood of game-changers in or across all warfighting 
domains. 
B. Select and deploy risk management techniques consistent with the Risk Management Framework 
that support not only informed, but also efficient, timely decision making.  
C. Base risk and innovation decisions on their mission impact, and contextualize information 
security risks in the context of mission assurance. Prioritize cyber risk acceptance that is 
reasonably likely to reduce higher magnitude mission risks. 
D. Work horizontally, across acquisition programs and operational commands, bringing key decision 
makers to the same table, and ensure that those accepting cyber risk are well-positioned to 
understand the mission impact. 
E. Invest in understanding the cyber terrain, its constant attributes, and evolutionary processes. 
Research and define how the cyber risk terrain differs across operational and R&D environments. 
                                                     
14 DoD Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Guide (DAU), June 2015, Available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/RIO-Guide-
Jun2015.pdf.  
15 See, Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (April 2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (1st ed.). London: Penguin. 
16 See, generally, Johnson, Mark W. (November 2010). Risk management and innovation. Bloomberg Business. Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/nov2010/id2010118_752981.htm.  
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In the Analects, Confucius wrote, “Study the past if you would define the future.” Our study of the 
Navy’s history of innovation tells us that legacy must continue, even more so now that we face a new 
domain. We must take cyber risks seriously and reduce them where we can reasonably do so, and we (the 
authors) spend much of our time advocating for as much. However, the nature of the Navy’s mission 
demands that cyber risk be viewed in light of need for game-changing innovation and the risk-taking 
required to achieve it. 
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